Changing Simplistic Worldviews

Maxim Senkov and Toygar T. Kerman

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a simplistic worldview: he ignores the dependency between the two dimensions of the state. We provide a characterization for the sender’s gain from persuasion both when the receiver is naive and when he is rational. We show that the receiver benefits from having a simplistic worldview if and only if it makes him perceive the states in which his interest is aligned with the sender as less likely.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; misspecified prior; correlation neglect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Changing Simplistic Worldviews (2024)
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