How Does Dishonesty Spread? Gender Matters!
Kim L. Böhm,
Sebastian Goerg and
Lilia Wasserka-Zhurakhovska
No 10314, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
Using an online experiment with two distinct dishonesty games, we analyze how dishonesty in men and women is influenced by either thinking or learning about the dishonesty of others in a related but different situation. Thinking is induced by eliciting a belief about others’ dishonesty in a different game. Such belief elicitation increases males’ (but not females’) dishonesty. Learning is induced by receiving a signal about the actual honest or dishonest choices of others in a different game. We find that females’ (but not males’) dishonesty increases with the level of dishonesty provided in such a signal. We conclude that gender matters when examining how unethical behavior spreads. Both genders update their beliefs about others’ dishonesty in the same way when presented with information about others’ choices. Still, dishonesty in men is triggered by merely thinking about others’ dishonesty, while women only respond to actual information on others’ dishonesty.
Keywords: dishonesty; unethical behaviour; beliefs; signals; gender; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D01 D80 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-gth, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10314
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