Wage Bargaining and Labor Market Policy with Biased Expectations

Almut Balleer, Georg Duernecker, Susanne Forstner and Johannes Goensch

No 10341, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Recent research documents mounting evidence for sizable and persistent biases in individual labor market expectations. This paper incorporates subjective expectations into a general equilibrium labor market model and studies the implications of biased expectations for wage bargaining, vacancy creation, worker flows and labor market policies. Importantly, we find that under the widely used period-by-period Nash bargaining protocol, the model generates a counterfactual relationship between workers’ job separation expectations and wages. Instead, a wage setting process with less frequent wage renegotiations is found to be empirically consistent. Moreover, we show that the presence of biased beliefs can qualitatively alter the equilibrium effects of labor market policies. Lastly, when allowing for biased firms’ beliefs, we establish that only the difference between firms’ and workers’ biases matters for the bargained wage but not the size of biases.

Keywords: subjective expectations; labor markets; search and matching; bargaining; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D84 E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Wage bargaining and labor market policy with biased expectations (2024)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining and Labor Market Policy with Biased Expectations (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10341

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