The Puzzling Practice of Paying “Cash for Votes”

Anand Murugesan and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 10504, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The expression “cash-for-votes” describes a form of vote buying in which candidates for office pay individuals in exchange for their votes. That practice undermines the functioning of democracy but is pervasive in many parts of the world, especially in the Global South. We discuss estimates of cash-for-votes and rational choice theories to explain their existence. Cash-for-votes under secret ballots is puzzling as secret ballots make it impossible to verify an individual’s vote. We discuss the behavioral and experimental literature emphasizing factors such as reciprocity, unsophisticated voting, and inequality aversion, which complement standard economic explanations of the phenomenon.

Keywords: democracy; vote buying; secret ballot; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10504

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