Identifying Partisan Gerrymandering and Its Consequences: Evidence from the 1990 US Census Redistricting

Navid Sabet and Noam Yuchtman

No 10554, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We empirically identify politically-motivated redistricting and its consequences, studying the effects of changed electorate composition on US congressional district boundaries and on political outcomes. We exploit the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which legalized millions of immigrants, changing local electorates without changing demographics — legalized immigrants were already counted in the census. Where Democrats controlled the 1990 redistricting process, higher IRCA populations were associated with more spatially distorted districts. Consistent with theory, Democrats packed Hispanics (their ardent supporters) into majority-minority districts. House delegations had more Hispanics suggesting that partisan gerrymandering, in this case, served the historically disadvantaged.

Keywords: gerrymandering; minority political representation; immigrant legalization; state governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 J10 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-mig, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10554

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