Nudging: An Experiment on Transparency, Controlling for Reactance and Decision Time

Tobias Schütze, Carsten Spitzer, Philipp C. Wichardt and Philipp Christoph Wichardt

No 10599, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Is being informed about nudging detrimental to the effect of the nudge? This paper reports results from an experimental study (n = 623) testing the effects of transparency on the effectiveness of a default nudge while controlling for reactance and decision time. Overall, the data show that more people follow the default if the nudge is made transparent. More importantly, though, effects of transparency differ depending on whether people are fast or slow in their decision making. In particular, (only) slow decision makers react more positively (keeping the default) if nudging is made transparent. Moreover, the data also show an interaction of reactance and decision time in that more reactant subjects making slower decisions respond more negatively (i.e. leave the default more often). Thus, a positive effect of transparency as well as a negative impact of reactance can be established in the data if decision time is accounted for.

Keywords: nudging; transparency; reactance; decision time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D90 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-nud and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10599

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