Identifying Tax Compliance from Changes in Enforcement: Theory and Empirics

Andrew Bibler, Laura Grigolon, Keith F. Teltser and Mark Tremblay

No 10921, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Governments increasingly use changes in tax rules to combat evasion. We develop a general approach to point-identify tax compliance along with supply and demand elasticities; identification requires data on prices and quantities before and after changes in tax enforcement and a demand or supply shifter. We illustrate our approach using data on Airbnb collection agreements, where full enforcement is achieved by shifting the tax burden away from hosts to renters via the platform. We find that taxes are paid on roughly zero to 3.5 percent of Airbnb transactions prior to enforcement.

Keywords: tax evasion; compliance; statutory incidence; tax invariance; Airbnb; sharing economy; voluntary collection agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H22 H26 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Identifying Tax Compliance from Changes in Enforcement: Theory and Empirics (2024)
Working Paper: Identifying Tax Compliance from Changes in Enforcement: Theory and Empirics (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10921

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