The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior

Lina Lozano, Arno Riedl and Christina Rott

No 10932, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus (’pie size’). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on the information players have. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates.

Keywords: bargaining; asymmetric information; menstrual cycle; biological factors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D87 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior (2024)
Working Paper: The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10932

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