International Sanctions and Internal Conflict: The Case of Iran

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan () and Jerg Gutmann

No 11578, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This study investigates the case of Iran to evaluate how changes in the intensity of international sanctions affect internal conflict in the target country. Estimating a vector autoregressive model for the period between 2001q2 and 2020q3 with quarterly data on internal conflict and its three subcomponents (civil disorder, terrorism, and civil war) as well as a sanction intensity index, we find that an unexpected increase in sanction intensity causes an increase in both civil disorder and terrorism risk. In contrast, the risk of civil war declines after an increase in sanction intensity. These findings for Iran indicate that higher intensity sanctions may allow sender country governments to put pressure on target country political regimes without risking an outbreak of major violent conflicts. Therefore, more intensive sanctions, may also not be helpful in inducing violent regime change.

Keywords: sanctions; sanction intensity; internal conflict; civil disorder; terrorism; civil war; VAR model; Iran (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-int
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Related works:
Working Paper: International Sanctions and Internal Conflict: The Case of Iran (2024)
Working Paper: International Sanctions and Internal Conflict: The Case of Iran (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11578

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