Numbers Tell, Words Sell
Michael Thaler,
Mattie Toma and
Victor Yaneng Wang
No 11600, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
When communicating numeric estimates with policymakers, journalists, or the general public, experts must choose between using numbers or natural language. We run two experiments to study whether experts strategically use language to communicate numeric estimates in order to persuade receivers. In Study 1, senders communicate probabilities of abstract events to receivers on Prolific, and in Study 2 academic researchers communicate the effect sizes in research papers to government policymakers. When experts face incentives to directionally persuade instead of incentives to accurately inform receivers, they are 25-29 percentage points more likely to communicate using language rather than numbers. Experts with incentives to persuade are more likely to slant language messages than numeric messages in the direction of their incentives, and this effect is driven by those who prefer to use language. Our findings suggest that experts are strategically leveraging the imprecision of language to excuse themselves for slanting more. Receivers are persuaded by experts with directional incentives, particularly when language is used.
JEL-codes: C91 D73 D83 D91 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11600
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