Worker Rights in Collective Bargaining

Benjamin W. Arold, Elliott Ash, W. Bentley Macleod () and Suresh Naidu

No 11766, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) specify the contractual rights of unionized workers, but their full legal content has not yet been analyzed by economists. This paper develops novel natural language methods to analyze the empirical determinants and economic value of these rights using a new collection of 30,000 CBAs from Canada in the period 1986-2015. We parse legally binding rights (e.g., “workers shall receive...”) and obligations (e.g., “the employer shall provide. ..”) from contract text, and validate our measures through evaluation of clause pairs and comparison to firm surveys on HR practices. Using timevarying province-level variation in labor income tax rates, we find that higher taxes increase the share of worker-rights clauses while reducing pre-tax wages in unionized firms, consistent with a substitution effect away from taxed wages toward untaxed rights. Further, an exogenous increase in the value of outside options (from a leave-one-out instrument for labor demand) increases the share of worker rights clauses in CBAs. Combining the regression estimates, we infer that a one-standard-deviation increase in worker rights is valued at about 5.7% of wages.

Keywords: worker rights; collective bargaining; natural language processing; employment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 J32 J52 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11766.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Worker Rights in Collective Bargaining (2025)
Working Paper: Worker Rights in Collective Bargaining (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11766

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().