How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?

Helge Berger () and Till Mueller

No 1344, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the “one country, one vote principle”. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.

Keywords: Central Bank; Federal Central Bank; Currency Union; optimal representation; voting; ECB (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1344

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