Designing Benefit Rules for Flexible Retirement with or without Redistribution

Andras Simonovits ()

No 1370, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.

Keywords: flexible retirement; asymmetric information; actuarial fairness (neutrality); mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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