When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni

No 1421, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.

JEL-codes: F22 J51 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1421

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