Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector

Torberg Falch and Bjarne Strøm

No 1629, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.

Keywords: public sector labor market; wage bargaining; political strength; budgetary process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1629

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