The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation

Alessandro Cigno

No 1632, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.

Keywords: intergenerational cooperation; family; fertility; saving; private transfers; education; child benefits; pensions; self-enforcing constitutions; direct democracy; representative democracy; constitutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Chapter: The political economy of intergenerational cooperation (2006)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1632

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