Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?

Alessandro Cigno

No 1772, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably reduces the marginal return to labour, and will thus discourage labour. A Bismarckian scheme can do so only if it is not actuarially fair, or in the presence of credit rationing. In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour less if the scheme is Bismarckian than if it is Beveridgean. A Bismarckian scheme may even encourage labour.

Keywords: tax wedge; labour; public pensions; Bismarck; Beveridge; implicit pension tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is there a social security tax wedge (2008)
Working Paper: Is There a Social Security Tax Wedge? (2006)
Working Paper: Is there a social security tax wedge? (2006)
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