Existence, Uniqueness and Some Comparative Statics for Ratio- and Lindahl Equilibria: New Wine in Old Bottles

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Wolfgang Peters

No 1802, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more general concept of the cost-share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be ex-ploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria.

Keywords: public goods; Lindahl equilibrium; ratio equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: EXISTENCE, UNIQUENESS AND SOME COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR RATIO- AND LINDAHL EQUILIBRIA: NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1802

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