Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations
Marcus Dittrich (marcus.dittrich@th-deg.de),
Andreas Knabe and
Kristina Leipold
No 3862, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that male players are able to obtain better bargaining outcomes than female players. Male employees get higher wages than female employees. Male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees. Moreover, we find gender differences in the first offers of the bargaining game.
Keywords: gender differences; wage bargaining; labor market experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3862.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EXPERIMENTAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3862
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe (wohlrabe@ifo.de).