The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

Toke Aidt, Facundo Albornoz and Martin Gassebner

No 3957, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson’s [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Keywords: political transitions; democracy; autocracy; IMF; World Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F53 F59 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The golden hello and political transitions (2018)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Hello and Political Transitions (2012)
Working Paper: The Golden Halo and Political Transitions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3957

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