Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

Matthew Gould and Matthew Rablen

No 4818, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members – robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.

Keywords: United Nations; United Nations Security Council; United Nations Security Council reform; equity; efficiency; voting power; square-root rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency (2017)
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2016)
Working Paper: Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4818

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