Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

No 5501, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.

Keywords: auctions; information release; information partitions; order statistics; stochastic orders; dispersion; dispersive order; excess wealth order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2017)
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015)
Working Paper: Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release (2015)
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5501

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