The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse

Björn Bartling and Yagiz Özdemir

No 6696, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument “if I don’t do it, someone else will” to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the “replacement excuse” if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.

Keywords: replacement excuse; social norms; moral behavior; competition; markets; utilitarianism; deontological ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-evo, nep-hme and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6696.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The limits to moral erosion in markets: Social norms and the replacement excuse (2023)
Working Paper: The limits to moral erosion in markets: social norms and the replacement excuse (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6696

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().