Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information

Antonio Cabrales, Michalis Drouvelis, Zeynep Gurguy and Indrajit Ray ()

No 6781, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when they players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination.

Keywords: battle of the sexes; private information; cheap talk; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6781

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