International Agreements, Economic Sovereignty and Exit

Martin Richardson and Frank Stähler

No 6941, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a model in which it is uncertainty about the future domestic policy environment that both makes international cooperation attractive and induces the possibility of a nation reneging on such an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting in which the likelihood of exit is affected by the degree of cooperation, that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation. “Full” cooperation will never be optimal, and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to “squeeze out” any possibility of exit. However, an increase in global uncertainty may imply an increase in cooperation when exit risks are already large to begin with.

Keywords: international agreements; international cooperation; exit; sovereignty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 F51 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: International agreements, economic sovereignty and exit (2019)
Working Paper: International Agreements, Economic Sovereignty and Exit (2017)
Working Paper: International Agreements, Economic Sovereignty and Exit (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6941

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