How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search - A Field Experiment
Michèle Belot,
Philipp Kircher and
Paul Muller
No 7302, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study how job seekers respond to wage announcements by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. High wage vacancies attract more interest, in contrast with much of the evidence based on observational data. Some applicants only show interest in the low wage vacancy even when they were exposed to both. Both findings are core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search where workers trade off the wage with the perceived competition for the job. A calibrated model with multiple applications and on-the-job search induces magnitudes broadly in line with the empirical findings.
Keywords: online job search; directed search; wage competition; field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J31 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7302.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search—A Field Experiment (2022) 
Working Paper: How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment (2018) 
Working Paper: How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment (2018) 
Working Paper: How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search: A Field Experiment (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7302
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