Race-Blind Admissions, School Segregation, and Student Outcomes: Evidence from Race- Blind Magnet School Lotteries

Jason Cook

No 7335, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies a school district that was federally mandated to adopt a race-blind lottery system to fill seats in its oversubscribed magnet schools. The district had previously integrated its schools by conducting separate admissions lotteries by race to offset its predominantly black applicant pools. The change dramatically segregated subsequent magnet school cohorts. More segregated schools enroll students with lower baseline achievement and employ lower valueadded teachers. Segregation is further exacerbated by “white flight” as white students transfer out of the district after attending more segregated schools. Ultimately, mandated segregation decreases student test scores and college attendance.

Keywords: keyword1; keyword2; keyword3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I24 I26 I28 J15 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Race-Blind Admissions, School Segregation, and Student Outcomes: Evidence from Race-Blind Magnet School Lotteries (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7335

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