Fighting Mobile Crime

Rosario Crino (), Giovanni Immordino and Salvatore Piccolo ()

No 7446, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.

Keywords: crime; enforcement; extradition; fleeing; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mig and nep-pay
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Related works:
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7446

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