Partial Norms

Giovanna d'Adda, Martin Dufwenberg, Francesco Passarelli and Guido Tabellini

No 7568, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.

Keywords: social norms; partial norms; normative expectations; consensus; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Partial Norms (2019)
Working Paper: Partial Norms (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7568

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