Dynamic hospital competition under rationing by waiting times

Luís Sá, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume

No 7661, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii) hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower waiting times, policies that promote patient choice will instead lead to higher waiting times. These results are robust to different game-theoretic solution concepts, designs of the hospital penalty structure, and patient utility specifications. Furthermore, waiting time penalties are likely to be more effective in reducing waiting times if they are designed with a linear penalty structure, but the counterproductive effect of patient choice policies is smaller when penalties are convex. These conclusions are partly derived by calibration of our model based on waiting times and elasticities observed in the English NHS for a common treatment (cataract surgery).

Keywords: hospital competition; waiting times; patient choice; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H42 I11 I18 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-hea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7661.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic hospital competition under rationing by waiting times (2019)
Working Paper: Dynamic Hospital Competition Under Rationing by Waiting Times (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7661

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().