A Dynamic Game with Interaction between Kantian Players and Nashian Players

Ngo Long

No 7729, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic model of the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.

Keywords: Kantian equilibrium; rule of behavior; categorical imperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Chapter: A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Players and Nashian Players (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7729

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