VAT Compliance, Trade, and Institutions

Peter Morrow, Michael Smart and Artur Swistak

No 7780, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a simple structural model of value added tax (VAT) compliance, and estimate it using widely available national accounts data to learn about compliance in countries where little is currently known. International border controls improve VAT compliance, generating a correlation between imports and aggregate VAT revenues that is informative about domestic non-compliance. Estimates suggest that revenue lost due to domestic non-compliance is large, particularly in countries with low perceived institutional quality. Border controls keep overall VAT revenues high especially in countries open to international trade.

JEL-codes: H25 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: VAT compliance, trade, and institutions (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7780

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