Institutions, Holdup and Automation

Giorgio Presidente

No 7834, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper documents a positive relationship between labor-friendly institutions and investment in industrial robots in a sample of advanced economies. Institutions explain a substantial proportion of cross-country variation in automation. The relationship between institutions and robots is stronger in sunk cost-intensive industries, where producers are more vulnerable to holdup. This suggests that automation is used by producers as a tool to thwart rent appropriation by labor.

Keywords: automation; robots; holdup; institutions; unions; sunk costs; appropriability; bargaining; frictions; rents; technology adoption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 O33 O43 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions, Holdup, and Automation (2023)
Working Paper: Institutions, Holdup and Automation (2021)
Working Paper: Institutions, Holdup and Automation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7834

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