Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany

Carsten Hefeker

No 7892, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945 but that there was also initial resistance to both among German experts and officials. This is a rare case of the successful imposition of institutions from abroad. Events are discussed in light of Peter Bernholz’s requirements for stable money and a successful central bank.

Keywords: currency reform; Bundesbank; central bank independence; institutional reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 N14 N24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pay
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany (2021)
Working Paper: Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7892

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