Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability

Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo and Luca Repetto

No 8204, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.

Keywords: government stability; fragmentation; no-confidence votes; bargaining; alignment effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H70 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8204.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall: Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8204

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().