Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory

Pierpaolo Battigalli () and Martin Dufwenberg

No 8285, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on own or others’ beliefs. It allows for incorporating, e.g., emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology.

Keywords: psychological game theory; belief-dependent motivation; reciprocity; emotions; image concerns; self-esteem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Journal Article: Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8285

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