Improving Public Good Supply and Income Equality: Facing a Trade-Off

Wolfgang Buchholz () and Dirk Rübbelke

No 8786, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result may be moderate what in particular is shown through an example with CES preferences.

Keywords: public good; Nash equilibrium; Lindahl equilibrium; income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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