Communication and Social Preferences: An Experimental Analysis

Antonio Gabrales, Francesco Feri, Piero Gottardi, Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez () and Antonio Cabrales

No 8850, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself.

Keywords: experiments; cheap talk; deception; conflicts of interest; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8850

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