Can Charitable Appeals Identify and Exploit Belief Heterogeneity?

Michalis Drouvelis and Benjamin Marx

No 8855, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some individuals to give less. We investigate whether a simple mechanism without incentives can predict heterogeneity in charitable responses to peer decisions. We elicit beliefs about donations in a baseline solicitation, and in subsequent solicitations we randomly assign information about others’ donations. We find that elicited beliefs are often logically inconsistent and that many subjects fail to update beliefs when treated. However, elicited beliefs can predict heterogeneous treatment effects if individuals are engaged and the information is salient.

Keywords: charitable; donation; norm; social preferences; peer effects; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D01 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can charitable appeals identify and exploit belief heterogeneity? (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8855

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