The Economics of Platform Liability
Yassine Lefouili and
Leonardo Madio
No 8919, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
Public authorities in many jurisdictions are concerned about the proliferation of illegal content and products on online platforms. One often discussed solution is to make the platform liable for third parties’ misconduct. In this paper, we first identify platform incentives to stop online misconduct in the absence of liability. Then, we provide an economic appraisal of platform liability that highlights the intended and unintended effects of a more stringent liability rule on several key variables such as prices, terms and conditions, business models, and investments. Specifically, we discuss the impact of the liability regime applying to online platforms on competition between them and the incentives of third parties relying on them. Finally, we analyze the potential costs and benefits of measures that have received much attention in recent policy discussions.
Keywords: liabilities rules; online platforms; illegal content and products; intellectual property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K42 L22 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-pay
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8919_0.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The economics of platform liability (2022)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platform Liability (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8919
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