Stable Partial Cooperation in Managing Systems with Tipping Points

Florian O. O. Wagener, Aart de Zeeuw and Florian O.O. Wagener
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florian Oskar Ottokar Wagener

No 8944, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Tipping of a natural system, entailing a loss of ecosystem services, may be prevented by stable partial cooperation. The presence of tipping points reverses the grim story that a high level of cooperation is hard to achieve and leaves large possible gains of cooperation. We investigate a tipping game with constant emissions and a piecewise linear response, and the well-known lake system with concave-convex dynamics and time-dependent emissions. Tipping back, leading to a gain in services, can also be induced by stable partial cooperation, but is harder to achieve. A physically reversible natural system may prove to be socially irreversible.

Keywords: tipping points; multiple Nash equilibria; stable partial cooperation; ecological systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8944.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable partial cooperation in managing systems with tipping points (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8944

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().