Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle

Alessandro Cigno

No 9226, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular, and the emergence and persistence of rules or norms, from a family per-spective. In models where every new person is effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new traits making their appearance occurs in models where the trait characterizing any given member of any given generation is a combination of traits drawn at random from those represented in the previous generation. Preferences may be altruistic or non-altruistic, but individuals may behave as if they were altruistic even if they are not, because a rule or norm may make it in their interest to do so. Evolutionary stability and renegotiation proofness play analogous roles, the former by selecting altruistic preferences, and the latter by selecting cooperation-inducing rules.

Keywords: evolution; preferences; family rules; social norms; socialization; matching; hold-up problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D01 D02 D13 J13 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-evo and nep-isf
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rules, preferences and evolution from the family angle (2021)
Working Paper: Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle (2021)
Working Paper: Rules, preferences and evolution from the family angle (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9226

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