Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists

Emanuel Hansen

No 9374, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.

Keywords: elections; party formation; platform choice; electoral uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9374

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