Corruption in Customs

Cyril Chalendard, Ana Fernandes (), Gaël Raballand () and Bob Rijkers

No 9489, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.

Keywords: corruption; tax enforcement; tariff evasion; trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F13 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-int, nep-iue and nep-pbe
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https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9489.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption in Customs (2023)
Working Paper: Corruption in Customs (2023)
Working Paper: Corruption in Customs (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9489

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