Child Penalties in Politics

Jon Fiva and Max-Emil M. King

No 9611, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Women tend to experience substantial declines in their labor income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such “child penalties” also exist in the political arena? Using extensive administrative data from Norway and an event-study methodology, we find that women drop out of local politics to a larger extent than men after their first child is born. Parenthood also seems to have a differential long-term effect on women and men's political careers, which may explain why women, especially women with children, are underrepresented at higher levels of the political hierarchy.

Keywords: gender gap; child penalties; political selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 J13 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-eur, nep-gen, nep-lab and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Child Penalties in Politics (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9611

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