Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence

Arne Lauber, Christoph March and Marco Sahm

No 9651, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.

Keywords: sequential round-robin tournament; all-pay auction; fairness; intensity; strategic momentum; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9651.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence (2023)
Working Paper: Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9651

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().