Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions for Farsighted Countries: Integrated Analysis of Heterogeneous Countries
Sareh Vosooghi,
Maria Arvaniti () and
Frederick (Rick) van der Ploeg
No 9768, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study formation of international climate coalitions. Countries are farsighted and rationally predict the consequences of their membership decisions in climate negotiations. Within the context of an integrated assessment model of the economy and the climate, we characterise the equilibrium number of coalitions and their number of signatories independent of certain types of heterogeneity, and show that the resulting treaties are robust to renegotiation. With a richer structure of energies we investigate possible coalition outcomes for a calibrated model. We confirm our heterogeneity results and in contrast to earlier approaches based on internal andexternal stability, much larger coalitions can be sustained in equilibrium.
Keywords: climate economics; international environmental agreements; coalition formation; heterogeneous countries; integrated assessment models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D70 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-ene and nep-env
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Working Paper: Self-enforcing climate coalitions for farsighted countries: integrated analysis of heterogeneous countries (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9768
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