Autonomous Vehicles: Moral Dilemmas and Adoption Incentives

Eberhard Feess () and Gerd Muehlheusser

No 9825, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In unavoidable traffic accidents, autonomous vehicles (AVs) face the dilemma of protecting either the passenger(s) or third parties. Recent studies show that most people prefer AVs following a utilitarian approach by minimizing total harm. At the same time, however, they would adopt an AV only if it prioritizes the passenger(s), i.e. themselves. As AVs exhibit a lower accident risk in the first place, a regulator therefore faces a trade-off: the harm-minimizing behavior of AVs (ex post efficiency) hampers the willingness to adopt them (ex ante efficiency). Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze how the second-best optimal level of AV passenger protection depends on (i) the AV safety advantage, (ii) the intensity of drivers’ social preferences, and (iii) their reluctance to adopt AVs. A higher AV safety advantage may either increase or decrease the second best optimal level of passenger protection.

Keywords: autonomous vehicles; ethical dilemma; trolley problem; adoption of new technologies; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L51 L62 O31 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-tre
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