Taxing Moral Agents

Esteban Muñoz Sobrado

No 9867, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Experimental and empirical findings suggest that non-pecuniary motivations play a significant role as determinants of taxpayers’ decision to comply with the tax authority and shape their perceptions and assessment of the tax code. By contrast, the canonical optimal income taxation model focuses on material sanctions as the primary motive for compliance. In this paper, I show how taxpayers equipped with semi-Kantian preferences can account for both these non-pecuniary and material motivations. I build a general model of income taxation in the presence of a public good, which agents value morally, and solve for the optimal linear and non-linear taxation problems.

Keywords: optimal income taxation; Kantian agents; prosocial motivations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9867

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