Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts

No 9900, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is the bidder's sensibility, the higher is the optimal participation.

Keywords: first-price auction; entry; monotonic signalling; social status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2023)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling (2016)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9900

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